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Value for Money? Neo-Liberalism in New South Wales Prisons
I n September 2005 the New South Wales (NSW)Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee released
a report entitled Value for Money from NSW
Correctional Centres. The report considers three different
approaches to correctional service delivery in NSW.
These can be loosely categorised as public prisons;
private prisons and a ‘way forward’ model that draws
on elements of both. The report is part of a global trend
whereby policymakers have sought to determine which
mixture of private and/or public prison arrangements
are the most efficient and effective (Schicor 1995; Cooper
and Taylor 2005; Roth 2004; Andrew 2007).
We argue that this report is fundamentally flawed on
its own terms. Although efficiency has many meanings,
we posit the most significant measure of efficiency for
the NSW government in its value for money assessment
has been ‘cost-effectiveness’, rather than service delivery,
and the stated ‘corrective’ objectives of incarceration.
It is undeniable that cost-effectiveness is important in
the design of any policy, but it is only ever part of the
story (Newberry and Pallot 2003). In this case ‘cost-
effectiveness’ has been given such a central position that
other issues that should be considered in the design of
good prison policies have been neglected. Not only is
cost considered central to the NSW government’s prison
policy recommendations, we show how the cost data
used to build an understanding of the prison sector is
flawed and based on assumptions that are not supported
with externally verifiable evidence.
We also argue that the report positions workplace
reform as the central innovation required for positive
transformation of the prison system in NSW. Although
other aspects of innovation are acknowledged, labour
reform receives the most significant attention within
all aspects of the report. While we recognise that the
maintenance of a private prison in NSW has a number of
objectives, our reading of this report suggests its primary
purpose has been to discipline labour. It is an example of
the use the private sector to achieve reforms within the
public sector.
New South Wales Prisons
Our Mission:
Managing offenders in a safe, secure and humane
manner and reduce risks of re-offending
The NSW prison sector has undergone considerable
reform over the last ten years. The NSW government now
oversees the operation of publicly managed prisons, one
privately managed prison and a number of new public
prisons operating under the new ‘Way Forward’
management model. In order to establish which approach
to prison management offered the best value for money,
the NSW government undertook a ‘value for money’
assessment in 2005. In this article, we argue the cost
accounting information is privileged in the assessment
process. However, we contend that this information was
limited and partial, and provided a poor basis on which to
form policy. Even so, the NSW government has proceeded
on this basis. In order to explain this, we position the
report within the wider neo-liberal turn in policymaking
and the workplace reforms that have accompanied it.
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Our Vision:
Contribute to a safer community through quality
correctional services
(NSW Department of Corrective Services, <www.dcs.
nsw.gov.au/about us/Mission and Vision.asp>, last ac-
cessed 17 April 2007)
The delivery, management and maintenance of prisons
are no longer the exclusive domain of government. In
2007, about 17% of the overall prison population of
Australia was held in a private facility (Andrew 2007).
NSW has adopted incarceration policies that have led to
a prison population that in 2004–2005 was about 10%
above the national average (Auditor-General 2006). At
the last census date, in June 2006, NSW held the largest
number of prisoners in Australia, with approximately
9800 sentenced and unsentenced people incarcerated
(<www.justiceaction.org.au/index.php?option=com
content&task=blogsection&id=9&Itemid=30>, last ac-
cessed 17 April 2007). Without a doubt, NSW incar-
ceration policies place a significant burden on the prison
system, and the state now has 35 correctional centres
that need to be operated and maintained. None of these
centres are identical. For instance, they vary in terms
of size, security level, geographical location, the age
of the infrastructure and the gender of the inmates.
The ability of the government to maintain and expand
prisons to meet the growing demand for prison space
and services has caused considerable concern within the
government.
The Report: ‘Value for Money’
Despite the promise of cost reduction, much evidence
shows that the cost differences between state and private
prisons are insignificant. (Cooper and Taylor 2005,
p. 506)
The Public Accounts Committee is an extension of
the NSW Legislative Assembly, taking direction from
ministers or the Auditor-General to scrutinise the
‘efficiency and effectiveness’ of government activities.
In April 2005, the Public Accounts Committee began an
inquiry into the ‘value for money’ of NSW correctional
centres. The report states that ‘value for money is usually
defined as the efficient, effective and economic use of
resources’ (Public Accounts Committee Report No.156,
2005, p. iv); however, no definition of efficiency and
effectiveness is provided. Considering the complexity
of issues that surround the provision of correctional
centres, most significantly their stated purpose (in NSW
this is corrective) and the acceptable means through
which this purpose can be obtained (such as the level of
educational opportunities, work experience programs
and drug rehabilitation considered appropriate to
correct ‘criminal’ behaviour), it is noteworthy that a
definition of ‘efficient and effective’ is not provided as
this would help set up a basis for assessment. Although
service quality and policy outcomes are essential to a
determination of ‘value for money’, these are peripheral
to the NSW report (2005). We argue that this enables the
report to position cost-effectiveness at the heart of NSW
prison policy and legitimises public debate that focuses
on this issue, while delegitimising alternative criteria
for assessment, such as safety, educational outcomes or
low recidivism (in NSW about 40% of people released
from prison return to serve a sentence within two years)
(Auditor General 2002; Andrew 2007).
Cost over value?
‘Value for money’ is an increasingly popular approach to
assessing the ‘value’ of current and future government
policies and projects (Jacobs 1998). Considering its
significance it is surprising that it has not been clearly
defined within the literature and that the terms of
assessment remain ambiguous (Grimsey and Lewis
2005). In general, value for money has involved the
assessing of the cost and quality trade-off to determine
the viability of a current or potential project in terms of
its stated objectives. Unfortunately, for the most part
this interpretation is not one that has been adopted
by governments in their assessments. According to
Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p. 375) ’the value for money
test frequently comes down to a simple, single point
comparison between two procurement options . . . the
problem is that value for money is more often than not
poorly understood and often equated with the lowest
cost’.
The report ‘Value for Money from NSW Correctional
Centres’ (Public Accounts Committee Report No. 156,
2005) substantiates the argument that value is being
equated with cost. In this report, there was no discussion
of what may constitute ‘value’. Instead it was assumed
throughout the report that cost and value are ostensibly
synonymous. This privileging of ‘cost’ is evident from the
outset and is embedded in the report’s terms of reference,
which begins with two objectives that state the report
will make cost comparisons within and across the sector.
Somewhat paradoxically, the third objective of the report
focuses on the development of appropriate costing
methods that enable such comparisons. The report
acknowledges the difficulties associated with costing and
cost comparisons within the sector, but states clearly that
despite this, ‘the focus of this inquiry is on the financial
aspects of value for money’ (Public Accounts Committee
Report No.156, 2005, p. 14). It is also apparent from the
terms of reference that, apart from safety considerations,
other markers of ‘value’, such as the quality of the
services provided, will not be the focus of the report.
Specifically, the terms of reference state that the report
should:
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1. Consider the current initiatives being undertaken
by the Department of Corrective Services (DCS)
to improve safety and cost effectiveness of
correctional centre management;
2. Compare the cost of corrective services provided by
public correctional centres using the Way Forward
program and by private operators; and
3. Review whether the planned improvements to
the DCS calculation of costs will facilitate better
comparisons between private and public sector
providers (Public Accounts Committee, Report
No.13/53 (No.156), 2005, p. iv).
These terms of reference offer an implicit recognition
that cost comparisons cannot be made. However, it is
important to acknowledge that qualitative matters are
considered to some extent within the report, but we
contend that the report is written in such a way that this
is a marginal concern. Unlike cost, quality information is
seen to be relatively easy to compare and as a result does
not present the same difficulties in a value assessment
as those related to its cost. It is well documented
that the cost data available are limited and the nature
of the sector makes any such direct comparison all
but impossible (Roth 2004). It is also apparent that
‘value for money’ is ill-defined and, as shall be argued,
it is questionable whether realistic cost comparisons
and assessments are the motivation for such a report.
However, it does enable policymakers to reaffirm cost as
the central policy consideration and relegate other issues
into the margins of public debate (Andrew 2007). It also
allows the government an opportunity to position new
workplace changes to the sector in ‘neutral’ cost terms
(as discussed later). Although we acknowledge that the
terms of reference of all reports must be limited, we
consider the boundaries of this report to be part of a
strategy to position cost at the heart of prison policy
discussions.
Partial cost?
Not only does the report focus on cost rather than ‘value’,
the cost data that are provided is inadequate. The report
begins with an outline of inmate costs per day, which
represents the costs in a way that fails to acknowledge
their partiality and ambiguity. The table appearing on
page one of the report (Table 1, shown below), suggests
the cost per day to incarcerate a person in a private prison
Table 1 Average costs per inmate (taken from the Public Accounts Committee Report 2005)
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04
Department of Corrective Services Average cost per inmate per day $167.85 $187.00 $187.80
Junee Correctional Centre Average cost per inmate per day $92.04 $93.54 $91.75
(Junee) is almost half the cost per day of incarceration in a
public prison. This table frames the discussion that takes
place in the remainder of the report, and although the
limitations of this data are mentioned, it is nonetheless
on this basis that the report proceeds.
If the information presented in Table 1 were adequate,
presenting accurate and comparable cost data, it would
be logical to conclude that private prisons are cheaper. If
we conclude that they were cheaper, it would be possible
to argue they were more efficient and therefore a better
use of public funds if this were accepted as the criteria
for assessment. However, the story is not this simple.
Although the table may be strikingly effective in creating
an impression of private prison cost-effectiveness, the
information is flawed on many levels.
First, the representation of the average cost per
inmate per day in the Junee private prison cannot be
substantiated with any externally verifiable evidence. The
report states in a footnote:
These figures were not in the Auditor-General’s Reports
to Parliament. They have been calculated by dividing
the quoted annual cost amounts by the number of days
in the year. This is the cost to DCS; i.e the management
fee plus the allocation of department overheads and not
the actual cost to the private operator. (Public Accounts
Committee Report No.156, 2005, p. 1)
These figures have been created for this report, yet
there is no detailed explanation as to what constitutes
the figures. The Auditor-General’s report (2002) didn’t
include this figure because it was considered too difficult
to determine. As the comparative data provided in this
table are central to the presentation of the discussion
within the report, it would seem appropriate that the
Public Accounts Committee substantiate its calculation.
Significantly, the allocation of departmental overheads
is never completely clear and requires management
accountants to make decisions as to how these should
be reflected in their accounts. There is much room
for distortion and manipulation here, and although the
report claims the ‘cost per inmate’ includes overheads,
we are not told what proportion of the Department
of Corrective Service’s overheads were attributed to the
private operator. This complexity of cost allocations is
widely acknowledged within the literature (Alam and
Lawrence 1994; Doost 1997). For instance, Marshall
(1994, p. 12) argued that ‘when overhead is allocated,
costs become politicized’. Considering that the report
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proceeds on this basis, it is of concern that these cost
allocations are not discussed in more detail.
Second, the report relies heavily on the Auditor-
General’s reports to Parliament; however, in the
presentation of this cost data the report downplays
the inadequacy of this information. For example, the
Auditor-General (2002) stated that the weighted average
cost of an inmate held in one of the state’s publicly run
prisons in 2001–2002 was $61 265 per year. However,
the cost of an inmate held in the state’s private prison at
Junee was $33 595 per year. Significantly, the Auditor-
General’s 2002 report states that ‘this cost cannot
be readily compared to the weighted average cost for
the Department of $61,265, as that cost incorporates
additional overhead and program costs’ (Auditor-
General 2002, p. 125). The nature of these overheads
and program costs are not revealed, but it is clear that
the calculation of the figure for Junee includes little more
than the direct management of the prison. It is unclear
how these figures deal with the costs incurred through
the process of overseeing the individual prisons and the
sector more broadly; the costs associated with contract
compliance and design costs; and the cost of the building
and grounds that are born by the government.
It is also apparent that Junee has been running below
capacity, yet the management fee is fixed irrespective of
the number of prisoners held there:
Over the year, the privately operated correctional centre
at Junee operated at 94.0 per cent of its capacity . . .
The management fee is fixed, and is based on providing
accommodation for 682 inmates. (Auditor-General
2002, p. 125)
Using simple strategies, these cost data distort the
representation of the efficiency of the private operator.
For instance, the cost per capita for 2001–2002 at the
Junee Correctional Centre is based on a capacity of 682
prisoners, when in fact there were only 641 prisoners.
Obviously, if the prison is being paid a set amount,
yet needs to provide less service, the cost data will be
distorted. The fact they were allowed to operate below
capacity is also interesting, considering state prisons have
been overcrowded, leading to other cost implications
related to the maintenance of a safe, orderly prison when
there are too many people in it (NSW Legislative Council
2001).
When cost comparisons are being constructed, it is
important to acknowledge that the cost per day of
housing prisoners is substantially different depending on
their classification. This is apparent when state-operated
prisons are compared to each other. These per capita cost
figures vary significantly; for instance, it costs $421.79
per day to house a prisoner in the Special Purpose
Centre at Long Bay, whereas it costs only $115.01 per day
at a minimum security prison (Auditor-General 2004).
This is equally true of the costs used to compare the
Department of Corrective Services (DCS) to Junee. The
figures appear to vary widely, with the private operator
appearing substantially more cost-effective; however,
this needs to be placed within the context of a very
diverse correctional system. The fact that the figures vary
widely is not evidence in and of itself, because as we
have shown, the cost figures will vary depending on the
nature of the costs included in the figure and the type of
prisoners/prison being compared.
Secret efficiencies
The actual internal operating efficiencies of the private
operator are not made publicly available. The Public
Accounts Committee Report states ‘the actual operating
costs for Junee are not available as GEO is a private
company that is in competition with other operators in
Australia and this information is commercially sensitive
(2005, p. 23). This statement reveals just how little
evidence the government has available regarding the
operational efficiencies of the private operator and
what strategies it is using to meet its contractual and
regulatory responsibilities, and also ensure a profit for
its shareholders. Although the public may be interested
only in the amount it costs to provide public or
private prisons, the internal efficiencies are still relevant.
There are many examples of arrangements that may
be made by private providers in order to meet their
broad contractual obligations at the lowest cost. For
instance, one provider sourced much of the internal
furnishing and clothing for the prison through a charity
(see Andrew 2007). How a prison manages to minimise
costs is fundamental to an accurate assessment of the
prison’s performance, and this may not be reflected in
a tick of the box style accountability that contractual
compliance audits rely on. Arguably, private prisons
are at a strategic advantage if they are able to keep
much of their operations confidential, as the public
sector competitors are required to make much of this
information publicly available.
To presume efficiency and proceed on this basis is
entirely insufficient, as is the argument that private
operators encourage innovation if that innovation is a
corporate secret and it will not be possible to use it to
influence the development of the sector.
Based on this discussion we argue that the privileging
of cost over value, the partiality of the costing offered
within the report, and the secrecy surrounding the
private operators’ efficiencies undermine the legitimacy
of the report on its own terms. As the report proceeds
on the basis of what we have shown to be inadequate,
and, at times misleading, information, we suggest that
the report legitimises strategic policy initiatives through
the use of what is presented as ‘neutral’ cost accounting.
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Neo-liberalism and NSW Prisons
It has been argued that the report Value for Money
from NSW Correctional Centres provides little sound
basis for a reasonable cost comparison between the
public and private forms of prison operation under the
NSW government’s jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the report
found that the privatised Junee prison offered superior
cost-effectiveness to that of the publicly managed
prisons. Using this finding as a justification, the report
recommended that at least one private prison should
be maintained in NSW to serve as a benchmark against
which the publicly operated prisons could be evaluated.
The obvious question arising from this seemingly
paradoxical outcome is: why did the report find the
privately operated prison to be superior in terms of cost-
effectiveness when insufficient evidence existed to make
such a case? It is to answering this question that we now
turn.
The use of private entities to provide correctional
services in NSW is part of a global neo-liberal shift in
policymaking. Although the shift to this kind of policy-
making has emerged unevenly, during the past 20 years,
neo-liberalism has become the globally dominant
‘rationality of government’ (Dean and Hindess 1998). As
a theory of governance, neo-liberalism (or synonymous
processes such as ‘economic rationalism’ and ‘economic
reform’) argues that markets are, in general, the most
efficient means of providing a host of social services
traditionally undertaken by governments. The rise of
neo-liberalism has seen the proliferation of processes
such as privatisation, deregulation and marketisation for
delivering public services. This rise is often explained
as a consequence of the triumph of a particular set of
ideas about policymaking (see, for example, Yergin and
Stanislaw 1998; Pusey 1991; Funnell 2001). According to
this account, the ‘Keynesian’ consensus in policymaking
that prevailed in most capitalist countries during the
post-World War II boom, and which entailed a strong
role for government in the regulation of economic
activity, was superseded, as policymakers came under
the sway of the neo-liberal worldview. According to
this argument, neo-liberalism has therefore become the
dominant logic of policymaking.
Such an analysis provides one possible explanation
for the findings of the Value for Money from NSW
Correctional Centres report. If neo-liberalism constitutes
the triumph of a particular ideology, and has become
the dominant logic of policymaking globally, then
in prioritising the private prison model the NSW
government is, it could be argued, simply following this
dominant logic. The paradigmatic dominance of neo-
liberalism would help explain why the government is
seemingly blind to the lack of evidence that informs its
decision.
In fact, this is the same general argument in relation
to neo-liberalism that has been put by many of its
critics. It is argued that the capture of policymaking
elites by neo-liberal modes of thought helps to explain
why, what such authors view as, an irrational ideology,
dominates policymaking. Pusey (1991, p. 8) for example
argues that ‘(t)he process of reform and rationalisation is
driven by an intellectual triumph of formal models over
practical substance’, while Funnell (2001, p. 1) writes,
‘(t)hroughout the Western world liberal democratic
governments have transformed themselves in the image
of the private sector and according to the beliefs of neo-
liberal ideologies’. While this explanation no doubt has
some merit, it ultimately relies upon the assumption
that governments have been captured by an ideology
that renders them blind to their own irrational decision-
making processes. In this case, to decisions based upon
inadequate cost accounting information.
In contrast we posit an alternative explanation that
emphasises the strategic aspects of the Value for Money
from NSW Correctional Centres report. This is not to deny
the importance of ideas in influencing policymaking,
nor the potentially socially deleterious and unintended
consequences of neo-liberal policy, nor the potential for
policymakers to make irrational and ill-conceived policy
decisions. Rather, it is to go beyond such explanations
and to recognise that rhetorical commitment to certain
philosophies of government – such as neo-liberalism
or new public management (Newberry 2004; Newberry
and Pallot 2003) – often belies the strategic political
motivations that underpin policy decisions.
The ‘Way Forward’
. . . (t)he proposed cost savings were illusory. Fur-
thermore, the underlying objectives driving the
proposals . . . were more complex than the apparently
transparent aim of saving money and providing value
for money (VFM). Behind the rhetoric we discern
the erosion of public sector pay and conditions and
the transfer of wealth from the public to private sector
through the perpetuation of a particular type of prison
regime. (Cooper and Taylor 2005, p. 501)
The previous discussion has illustrated how the cost data
presented provide an inadequate basis of assessment.
However, these data play a vital role in constituting the
terms of debate, offering visibility and legitimacy to cost
comparisons that are partial at best. It also legitimises the
development of ‘cost minimisation’ strategies, making
significant reforms possible within a debate that has been
captured by these terms.
We argue that this is strategic and is not an accidental
consequence of policy investigations and government
reports. It is the inevitable consequence of reports
that are framed almost entirely within the limited
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parameters of cost-effectiveness. One outcome of this has
been the development of the ‘Way Forward’ Workplace
reform within the public prison system, which has been
operating in the states’ two new prisons at Kempsey and
Dillwynia since 2004.
According to the report, the ‘main benefits’ of the ‘Way
Forward’ model are:
. . . reduced overtime, reduced sick leave and stream-
lining of operational functions. This has resulted in
significant cost savings when compared with correc-
tional centres operating under the traditional model.
Other advantages include improved security and safety
for both staff and inmates and increased rehabilitation
opportunities. (Public Accounts Committee, 2005,
p. 15)
While greater cost-efficiency is the acknowledged aim of
the ‘Way Forward’ model, a closer reading of the Value
for Money from NSW Correctional Centres report reveals
a broader agenda. The report states that Memorandums
of Understanding based upon the ‘Way Forward Model’
will be introduced in the future to replace existing
‘Operational Agreements’ in order to:
• Consult staff on matters related to safety and
workplace relations;
• Increase flexibility of management to pursue oper-
ational and economic key performance measures;
and
• Reduce the union focus on maximizing overtime
in future award negotiations. (Public Accounts
Committee, 2005, p. 16)
The last two points are revealing. They suggest that the
broader goals of the ‘Way Forward’ program are greater
managerial flexibility and a reduction in the purview
of union demands. Increased managerial flexibility is
noted in the document as an outcome of the ‘Way
Forward’ model. For example, the ‘let go’ and ‘lock
in’ process ‘allows more flexibility in managing staff
resources . . . This has resulted in overtime not being
the only solution to staff shortages’ (Public Accounts
Committee Report, 2005, p. 17). Similarly, changes to
the operation of court cells within correctional centres
means that: ‘staff can be redeployed between centres and
court cells to meet needs on a day to day basis. This will
allow greater flexibility in staff management and reduce
operating costs’ (Public Accounts Committee Report,
2005, p. 18). Furthermore, the proposed centralisation
of staff rostering under the ‘Way Forward’ model gives
greater power for the DCS to manage staff hours without
incurring overtime costs and curtails the ability of prison
staff to influence rostering decisions. The ‘Way Forward’
model therefore points to a regime of greater managerial
prerogatives, increased flexibility of management in the
deployment of labour, potential cost savings through the
reduction in over-time and sick leave, and a diminution
in union influence over these issues.
These reforms were negotiated using data that
illustrated the cost-effectiveness of the private model,
and the labour-related inefficiencies of the public
model. Throughout these negotiations the government
maintained its right to offer the new prisons to private
tenders if the negotiations were not successful. The union
representing prison staff, the Prison Officers Vocational
Branch (POVB) of the Public Service Association,
reported to its members that during negotiations over
the ‘Way Forward’ model, ‘At all times hovering in
the background is the spectre of privatisation. The
Government through Treasury has made it plain that
privatisation will follow if agreement on working
conditions, etc, is not achieved between the Union
and the department’ (Public Services Association 2004).
The POVB also claimed that ‘all available sources of
information confirmed the threat that the new prisons
were to be operated by the private sector’ (CPSU–SPSF
2004). One of these sources was John Hatzistergos,
Minister for Correctional Services, who informed union
officials at a meeting on 10 September 2003 that
‘private prison operations are continually approaching
the government for work’ (CPSU–SPSF 2003). It was
in this context that the ‘Way Forward’ reforms were
agreed to by the union. At the time, POVB official John
Scullion, argued that the agreement ensured ‘that more
than 500 jobs remain in the public sector’ (CPSU–SPSF
2004).
In effect, it seems that the government used the
possibility of further privatisation as a threat to discipline
the union representing prison staff into ceding to the
government’s Way Forward model. There is implicit
acknowledgement of this in the Value for Money from
NSW Correctional Centres report:
There was early speculation that the new correctional
centres at Kempsey and Dilwynia would be privatized.
Around the same time, DCS was negotiating with
the Prison Officers Vocational Branch (POVB) of
the Public Service Association to introduce the ‘Way
Forward’ workplace reform to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the public system. The negotiations
with the union proved successful and a new consent
award was established to cover these new facilities.
Subsequently in March 2004, the NSW Government
approved the public operation of the new correctional
centres’ (Public Accounts Committee Report 2005,
p. 19).
In light of this, the cost-effectiveness of the private sector
is almost irrelevant – the maintenance of an alternative
prison policy possibility offers the government a
tool to instigate workplace reform, while maintaining
an appearance of rationality and neutrality (Dillard
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1991). This is embodied in one of the report’s key
recommendations:
Recommendation 4: The Government should maintain
at least one private prison in the State for the purposes
of benchmarking the performance of publicly operated
centres and to encourage the development of innovative
management strategies” (Public Accounts Committee
2005, p. vii).
If we can rule out cost-effectiveness as the primary
purpose for maintaining private prisons in NSW, the
more revealing issues relate to workplace reforms. It
seems, at the very least, plausible to suggest that the
existence of the private prison at Junee acted as a
disciplinary device to pressure the union into accepting
the ‘Way Forward’ model, which ceded greater flexibility
and prerogative to prison management and reduced the
influence of the union over staffing.
When Junee opened in 1993, the government intended
for it to provide a benchmark for the public sector and
according to Roth (2004) the future direction of prison
management was heavily influenced by this decision.
When the company was awarded a second contract in
2001, this was seen as a sign of success that paved
the way for much speculation about the management
of future prisons. According to the Public Services
Association, which represents the public sector prison
officers, the decision to open publicly managed prisons
in the future rested entirely on their agreement to
substantial workplace reforms. Most significantly they
agreed to be paid a flat rate for overtime.
This is a position that was clear even before the
construction of Junee had begun, when in September
1989 the Kleinwort Benson Report (1989) recommended
to the state government that it approve the operation of
privately run prisons. The report stated that changes
in prison management would be accelerated through
the use of a private prison, and that it would provide
an effective benchmark to assess the efficiency of other
prisons within the sector. The report was endorsed by the
NSW state government, and it decided to recommend
that a medium security prison be built in Junee rather
than the maximum security prison initially intended in
order to facilitate privatisation.
Strong causal links between neo-liberal agendas and
workplace reforms have been noted elsewhere. For
example, Cooper and Taylor (2005), in a study of prison
privatisation in Scotland, identify reducing labour costs
and increasing labour flexibilities as a key reason for
privatisations. We contend that, in the specific case
of the New South Wales Value for Money from NSW
Correctional Centres report, the government’s support
for the maintenance of ‘at least one private prison’, in
the absence of meaningful cost data, was on the basis of
the continuing disciplinary effects it would have upon
the union, and therefore the leverage it would grant the
government in extending its workplace reform agenda.
In this context, the private prison acts as a form of
‘indirect regulation’, meaning ‘the capacity of the state to
regulate through a range of alternative mechanisms other
than formal rules (Gahan and Brosnan 2006, p. 133). In
this case, privatisation is used for the indirect regulation
of labour by the state.
That such processes might occur under a system
of neo-liberalism is consonant with recent scholarly
literature. A number of theorists, for example, note
the discrepancy between the ideology of neo-liberalism,
and the policies enacted by neo-liberal governments
(Anderson 1999; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Cahill
and Beder 2005; Harvey 2005). Indeed, a striking
feature of neo-liberal policymaking globally has been
the construction of a new and pervasive set of regulatory
apparatuses. While the ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange
1996) has often been understood as a consequence of
neo-liberalism, the experience of the last 20 years has
been the reconfiguration, not the diminution, of state
regulations (Harvey 2005, p. 78; Cahill and Beder 2005).
It was such observations that led Brenner and Theodore
(2002) to coin the term ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’,
in order to distinguish the real-world policy regimes of
neo-liberal states from the predicted outcomes of neo-
liberalism put forward by many of its supporters and
detractors alike. Similarly, Anderson (1999) argues that
the neo-liberal process of ‘deregulation’ often entails a
social and market ‘re-regulation’.
It is through such a conception of neo-liberalism that,
we argue, a more nuanced understanding of the ‘Value
for money’ document is possible. Close examination
of the Value for Money from NSW Correctional Centres
report reveals the operation of ‘actually existing’ neo-
liberal processes that re-regulate labour in the interests
of management. This is in keeping with scholarly analysis
of neo-liberal labour market deregulation in Australia,
which argues that governments have been empowered
to regulate labour in a range of new ways (Anderson
1999; Ellem 2006). That the NSW correctional system
embodies a hybrid model of privatised and government-
operated prisons reflects the ‘uneven geographical
development of neo-liberalism’ (Harvey 2005). The
Value for Money from NSW Correctional Centres report
also highlights the ways that accounting practices have
been used as vehicles for the implementation of neo-
liberal agendas globally (Newberry 2004; Newberry and
Pallot 2003; Cooper and Taylor 2005).
Conclusion
A critical examination of the NSW government’s Value
for Money from NSW Correctional Centres report into
prisons reveals that the cost data presented provides
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an inadequate basis for policy decisions about the
appropriate mix of public and private management
of prisons in NSW. That the cost data were found
wanting prompts the question of why the privatised
model of prison management was held to deliver
superior ‘value for money’. One possible answer to this
question is that the government has been influenced
by neo-liberal theories of policymaking to such an
extent that it prioritises private over public forms of
management even when there is little cost data to
support the neo-liberal belief that privatised modes
of service delivery are inherently more efficient than
public modes. While not denying the influence of
neo-liberal ideology upon policymakers, this article
has argued that a more plausible explanation is to
be found in the disciplinary leverage afforded to the
government over unions in negotiations over workplace
reform through the ongoing existence of a privatised
prisons in NSW. This highlights the ways in which the
presentation of accounting information can mask power
relations and political agendas, and therefore that critical
analytical tools have an important role to play in their
interpretation.
Jane Andrew is in the School of Accounting and Finance,
Faculty of Commerce, University of Wollongong, and
Damien Cahill is in the Discipline of Political Economy,
Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney. They thank the
two anonymous reviewers and the participants in the
2008 Critical Perspectives on Accounting Conference
whose comments have helped clarify and improve this
article.
References
Alam, M. and Lawrence, S. 1994, ‘A New Era in Costing
and Budgeting: Implications of Health Sector Reform in New
Zealand’, International Journal of Public Sector Management , 7,
6: 41–51.
Anderson, T. 1999, ‘The Meaning of Deregulation’, Journal of
Australian Political Economy, 44: 5–21.
Andrew, J. 2007, ‘Prisons, the Profit Motive and Other Chal-
lenges to Accountability’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting ,
18: 877–904.
Auditor-General, Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament 2002,
Volume 6, NSW Audit Office, Sydney.
Auditor-General, Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament 2004,
Volume 4, NSW Audit Office, Sydney.
Auditor-General, Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament 2006,
Volume 4, NSW Audit Office, Sydney.
Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. 2002, ‘Cities and the
Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’, Antipode, 34,
3: 349–79.
Cahill, D. and Beder, S. 2005, ‘Regulating the Power Shift: The
State, Capital, and Electricity Privatisation in Australia’, Journal
of Australian Political Economy, 55, June.
Cooper, C. and Taylor, P. 2005, ‘Independently Verified
Reductionism: Prison Privatization in Scotland’, Human
Relations, 58, 4: 497–522.
CPSU–SPSF (2003) ‘Union Executive Response to “Way
Forward” Proposal’, CPSU website, available at: <http://cpsu-
spsf.asn.au/campaigns/corr services/20030914 159.html>.
Last accessed 4 April 2008.
CPSU–SPSF (2004) ‘Public Union Best for Gaols: PSA
Retains Coverage of NSW Correctional Centres’, CPSU
website, available at: <http://cpsu-spsf.asn.au/latest news/
corr services/20040304 Prisons.html>. Last accessed 4 April
2008.
Dean, M. and Hindess, B. 1998, Governing Australia: Studies
in Contemporary Rationalities of Government , Cambridge
University Press, Melbourne.
Dillard, D. 1991, ‘Accounting as a Critical Social Science’,
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 4, 1: 8–28.
Doost, R.K. 1997, ‘What Is Our University Overhead Cost
Anyway?’, Managerial Auditing Journal, 12, 2: 94–7.
Ellem, B. 2006, ‘Beyond Industrial Relations: Workchoices
and the Reshaping of Labour, Class and the Commonwealth’,
Labour History, May: 211–20.
Funnell, W. 2001, Government by Fiat: The Retreat from
Responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney.
Gahan, P. and Brosnan, P. 2006, ‘The Repertoires of Labour
Market Regulation’, in Labour Law and Labour Market
Regulation, C. Arup et. al. (eds), The Federation Press, Sydney:
127–46.
Grimsey, D. and Lewis, M.V. 2005, ‘Are Public Private Part-
nerships Value for Money? Evaluating Alternative Approaches
and Comparing Academic and Practitioner Views’, Accounting
Forum, 29: 345–78.
Harvey, D. 2005, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Jacobs, K. 1998, ‘Value for Money Auditing in New Zealand:
Competing for Control in the Public Sector’, British Accounting
Review, 30: 343–60.
Kleinwort Benson Report (1989), Investigation into Private
Sector Involvement in the New South Wales Corrective Services
System: Stage 1, The Department of Corrective Services,
Sydney.
Marshall, G. 1994, ‘The Problem with Allocations’, CFO, 10,
8: 12.
Newberry, S. (2004), ‘Trade in Services: Wider implications
for Accounting Standard Setters and Accountants’, Australian
Accounting Review, 14, 2: 11–21.
Newberry, S and Pallot, J. 2003, ‘Fiscal (ir)responsibility:
Privileging PPPs in New Zealand’, Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability Journal, 16, 3: 467–92.
C© 2009 CPA Australia Australian Accounting Review 151
J. Andrew & D. Cahill Value for Money? Neo-Liberalism in New South Wales Prisons
NSW Department of Corrective Services, <http://www.dcs.
nsw.gov.au/about us/Mission and Vision.asp>. Last accessed
17 April 2007.
NSW Legislative Council, November 2001, ‘Select Committee
on the Increase in Prisoner Population’, Parliamentary Paper
Number 924, Parliament of NSW, Sydney.
Public Accounts Committee 2005, Value for Money from NSW
Correctional Centres, Report no. 156, Parliamentary Papers, no.
53/13, September, New South Wales Parliament, Legislative
Assembly, Australia.
Public Services Association 2004, ‘The Way Forward’,
media release, available at<http://www.psa.labor.net.au/news/
1076386158 24818.html>. Last accessed 4/4/08.
Pusey, M. 1991, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation
Building State Changes Its Mind, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Roth L. 2004, ‘Privatisation of Prisons: Background Paper’,
3/2004, Parliament of NSW, Sydeny.
Shichor D. 1995, ‘Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/public
Concerns’, SAGE Publications, US.
Strange, S. 1996, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power
in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Yergin, D. and Stanislaw, J. 1998, The Commanding Heights:
The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is
Remaking the Modern World, Simon and Schuster, New York.
152 Australian Accounting Review C© 2009 CPA Australia
